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This Policy Brief outlines how the Ethiopian government approaches irregular migration 
from the country in a context of growing 
international pressure to control such migration. 
Challenging socioeconomic and political conditions 
in the country, combined with extremely limited 
options for legal international migration, compel 
young men and women to undertake long and 
dangerous overland journeys across deserts 
and seas to reach destinations in Europe, the 
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Key lessons
• The intensification of migration controls through the criminalisation of brokers simply 
increases the need for those facilitating migration to be more creative. 
• This migration control regime attracts actors who are illegal in the eyes of the law and 
increases the risks faced by migrants rather than mitigating them.
• The Government of Ethiopia and other stakeholders such as the EU need to address the 
fundamental causes of migration and offer alternative legal channels of migration rather 
than targeting brokers.
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Migrants, while clandestinely transported 
by truck from Ethiopia to Djibouti.
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Middle East and southern Africa. Brokers play 
an indispensable role in facilitating such mobility. 
The Ethiopian government has adopted a 
proclamation which criminalises smugglers and 
human traffickers, and has simultaneously 
intensified the detention of migration brokers. 
However, so far, these measures have neither 
stopped brokerage nor effectively addressed 
the challenge of irregular migration. Smugglers 
have circumvented new controls by turning 
smuggling into a community enterprise, 
by involving unemployed young people, 
cross-border traders, farmers, pastoralists and 
law enforcement bodies.
A major migration hub
Ethiopia is a major hub of international migration 
in the Horn of Africa. Owing to its geostrategic 
location, the country is very important as an origin, 
a transit point and a destination for international 
migration. According to secondary sources (Mixed 
Migration Centre 2016) annual emigration from 
Ethiopia is roughly half a million, and 60–70 per 
cent of those emigrating are irregular migrants 
who use various land and sea routes and enlist 
the help of informal brokers and smugglers. 
Irregular migration from Ethiopia is a result of the 
unfavourable political environment, precarious 
socioeconomic conditions such as unemployment, 
shortages of farmland that deprive younger people 
of life chances, and aspirations for a better life in 
the future. 
Interviews with aspiring, current and return 
migrants in Addis Ababa, Hadya and Wallo 
between March and December 2018 show that 
young people not only dream of international 
migration but are also willing to take long and 
dangerous routes and travel across deserts, 
hazardous terrain and seas towards Europe via 
Sudan, crossing the Sahara Desert, Libya and 
the Mediterranean Sea. Some, the largest in 
proportion (UN 2015; Mixed Migration Centre 
2016), make long journeys towards the Middle 
East via Djibouti, Somalia and Yemen by crossing 
the Red Sea and the Gulf of Eden. The rest take 
overland and sea routes towards South Africa by 
crossing several international borders (Fekadu et al. 
2019). Reports of Ethiopian migrants’ deportations, 
detentions and deaths on their way to these 
destinations have become increasingly common. 
For instance, between June and November 2018 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
assisted in the deportation of close to 400 migrants 
stranded in Tanzania, most of them from Hadya; 
this was out of the more than 2,000 Ethiopians 
in different detention centres in Tanzania alone. 
Again, in June 2019, the IOM assisted in the 
deportation of another 2,100 Ethiopians stranded 
in Yemen.1 Furthermore, informants in Hadya said 
that they received roughly one body of a migrant 
who had died en route or at his/her destination 
every week. Those who have been deported back 
home after being intercepted on the way, also 
reveal human rights abuses committed by the law 
enforcement agencies, and traffickers and other 
criminal elements in the different countries they 
had to travel through and also during their stays in 
detention centres. 
The number of deaths, large number of 
deportations and reports of human rights 
abuses brought back home by the deportees 
and returnees reveal that migrants and their 
families do have sufficient information about the 
risks of migration before a  journey is embarked 
upon. Thus, decisions to migrate are made by 
consciously weighing up the potential risks along 
the route against the benefits of living elsewhere or 
continuing their lives back at home.
2
1 https://ethiopia.iom.int
The State, Brokers and Migration in Ethiopia: Can the Criminalisation of Brokers Mitigate Irregular Migration? 
http://migratingoutofpoverty.dfid.gov.uk/ 3
Criminalisation of brokers 
as migration governance
Recently the Ethiopian government and its 
international partners, especially the EU, have 
been making concerted efforts to control irregular 
migration from Ethiopia. The Government of 
Ethiopia has enacted a number of regulatory 
frameworks to encourage legal and safer migration 
and to mitigate irregular migration. Unlike the 
revolutionary socialist military regime (1974–90), 
which curtailed labour exits, the current regime 
(1991 to date) has liberalised emigration policy in 
Ethiopia. The 1998 proclamation that established 
private employment agencies (PEAs), bodies that 
would be responsible for facilitating overseas 
employment, recruiting workers, and protecting 
the rights, safety and dignity of Ethiopians 
employed abroad, resulted in the establishment 
of 400 PEAs. As a result, PEAs became the main 
mediators of labour migration from Ethiopia to the 
Middle East and sent hundreds of thousands of 
labour migrants, mainly female domestic workers, 
to posts abroad. For instance, according to data 
from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
(MOLSA), close to half a million citizens migrated to 
the Middle East between 2011 and 2013 through 
the PEAs. 
However, PEAs were only licensed to arrange 
placements in countries in the Middle East. Labour 
migrations to other parts of the world, such as 
South Africa, Sudan, northern Africa, and Europe 
were facilitated by informal brokers alone. This has 
made informal brokers indispensable for aspiring 
migrants and their families. Indeed, in Hadya, 
brokers facilitating migration to South Africa are 
given a nickname, berri kefach (door openers), in 
recognition of the crucial role they have played in the 
formation of a big Hadya diaspora in South Africa.
Intercepted migrants in Mille detention 
centre (Ethiopia–Djibouti border).
Photo: © Sisay Demile, 2018.
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In 2013, two important developments took place: 
first, the safer labour migration stream to the 
Middle East was (according to migrant accounts) 
banned by the Government of Ethiopia in response 
to media reports about abuses of domestic workers 
in the destination countries. That ‘temporary’ 
ban continued for over five years. Second, the 
government launched an organised campaign 
against informal brokers at the same time. A 
proclamation named Prevention and Suppression 
of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants 
(Proclamation 909/2015) was adopted swiftly 
and ‘anti-human-trafficking taskforces’ were 
established at different levels of the bureaucracy 
to target informal brokers. To broaden migration 
control activities, law enforcement organisations, 
religious leaders and traditional authorities have 
been persuaded to form anti-human-trafficking 
committees at the local level. Checkpoints have 
been set up along the main migration routes to 
intercept irregular migrants and capture brokers 
and smugglers. Hundreds of brokers have been 
convicted of trafficking and smuggling and are 
serving long prison sentences as a result of this 
organised campaign. The research team met 
brokers who had been imprisoned in Wallo and 
Hadya, where 62 and 50 individuals respectively 
had been sentenced to long prison terms after 
having been convicted of human trafficking and 
smuggling in persons (Ayalew et al. 2018; Fekadu 
et al. 2019).
The Ethiopian government’s efforts were backed by 
the EU’s externalisation of its border controls. The 
research team visited, for instance, NGOs that had 
been funded by the EU to train members of anti-
human-trafficking taskforces on the route to Europe 
via Sudan, and it has also observed IOM officers 
in Metema (Ethiopia–Sudan border) and Desheto 
(Ethiopia–Djibouti border) actively assisting the 
transportation of intercepted migrants back to their 
place of origin. 
Why criminalisation of 
brokers cannot control 
irregular migration
Brokerage is demand-driven
Our research shows that aspiring migrants look for 
brokers and ask them to facilitate their migration. 
It is not the other way around, as state campaigns 
suggest. In other words, as long as young 
people are willing to migrate, and families and 
communities are ready to support their intention 
to leave, there will continue to be a demand for 
informal brokers. 
Migrants feel more protected with 
brokers
Those who migrate with the help of brokers are 
better protected and better treated than those 
who travel without brokers. Thus, border policing 
and detention of brokers simply remove migrants’ 
protection and increase the risks associated with 
migration.
Brokers are part of the everyday life of 
the community
At the places of origin, brokers live and work 
alongside local people. They adhere to local 
norms and take part in community life. People 
are grateful to them for facilitating the migration 
of the young people, who are contributing to 
the local economy. For instance, the impact of 
the diaspora on transport facilities and financial 
institutions in Hadya is visible. The brokers 
also share the profits of smuggling with the 
communities by involving them in migration 
facilitation. They thus have the support 
and respect of the local communities and 
the customary and religious institutions 
(churches, mosques).
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Local communities benefit much more 
from migration facilitation than they do 
from official migration control
The structure of the migration industry reveals that 
many people take part in migration facilitation both 
at the point of origin and at several transit points 
on the journey. In these places many unemployed 
young people, underpaid civil servants, underpaid 
law enforcement agents, local militias, traders, 
hotel operators, minibus owners and lorry drivers 
profit from migration facilitation. All of these diverse 
actors located at different places support the 
migration industry. The total cost these days ranges 
from US$700 to US$5,000 per person depending 
on the route and individual negotiations. This is a 
100 per cent increase compared to five years ago 
because of more intensive surveillance. Women 
typically enter debt migration arrangements paying 
up to 50 per cent more than men. The control 
regime does not generate resources and support on 
such a scale.
Advances in technology make control 
very difficult
The expansion of communication to the 
borderlands, and sophisticated mobile money 
transfer technologies have helped migrants and 
their smugglers to facilitate migration without 
being tied to a fixed location. Thus, brokers can 
change their location to evade detection while 
continuing their business, including by escaping to 
neighbouring countries.
Recommendations
1 The Government of Ethiopia and other 
stakeholders that are actively engaging in migration 
governance in Africa, such as the EU, need to 
better understand the fundamental reasons 
for irregular migration and the reasons for the 
continuation of brokerage, rather than focusing on 
criminalising brokers. Bans and criminalisation only 
increase the costs and risks of migration rather 
than stopping clandestine migration. 
2 The reach and efficiency of formal migration 
processes need to be improved. This includes 
speeding up the licencing of PEAs and restarting 
their services. In addition to migration facilitation 
to the Middle East, there should also be 
negotiations with receiving countries in Europe 
and elsewhere to formalise migration channels 
and arrange work visas.
3 The Ethiopian government should negotiate 
with transit countries to better protect the 
human rights of migrants who are intercepted. 
Better humanitarian interventions, which do not 
criminalise irregular migrants, such as humane 
rescuing practices and better reintegration of 
victims, should be implemented. 
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